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FLORIDA'S POST 2000 VOTING
SYSTEMS OVERHAUL: THE ROAD

TO PERDITION
LIDA RODRIGUEZ-TASEFFt

I.

INTRODUCTION

In early 2001, after the disastrous election of 2000, Florida decided
to revamp its voting systems, as well as its elections laws, because it did
not want another disaster-it didn't want to be another Florida.
The 2001 overhaul of Florida's voting systems was outwardly sold to
Floridians as nothing more than simple legislation designed to upgrade
Florida's voting technology. Indeed, the "Electronic Voting Systems Act"
(the "Act"),' ostensibly modernized Florida's outdated voting machines
by authorizing the use of "electronic and electromechanical voting systems in which votes are registered electronically or are tabulated on automatic tabulating equipment or data processing equipment." 2 In
addition, effective September 2, 2002, the Act specifically prohibited any
apparatus or device "for the piercing of ballots by the voter"-in other
3
words, the infamous punch card system.
True to the old addage that "nothing is simple in Florida," the 2001
technology overhaul of the voting systems was really a vehicle to carry
t Lida Rodriguez-Taseff is counsel and Chair of the Miami-Dade Election Reform
Coalition. The Coalition is a non-partisan grass-roots organization dedicated to election
reform. Ms. Rodriguez-Taseff practices in the area of commercial litigation for Duane Morris in Miami, Florida, with an emphasis on complex commercial disputes, contract litigation, real estate litigation (including commercial lease disputes and foreclosures), class
action litigation, and copyright and trademark infringement litigation. She is admitted to
practice in Florida and New York and is a 1992 graduate of the New York University
School of Law, where she was a Root-Tilden-Kern Scholar and a recipient of the Vanderbilt
Medal, the highest honor bestowed by NYU. She is a graduate of the University of Miami
and she is fully fluent in written and spoken Spanish. Ms. Rodriguez-Taseff appears
weekly on CNN's Saturday morning segment, Legal Briefs, and is the national Spanish
media spokesperson for the American Civil Liberties Union. From 2001 to 2003, she served
as President of the American Civil Liberties Union's Greater Miami Chapter.
1. See Fla. Stat. §§ 101.5601 - 101.5614 (2002).
2. Fla. Stat. § 101.5602 (2002).
3. Fla. Stat. § 101.56042 (2002).
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out a more complex political agenda. The first part of that political
agenda had to do with damage control and cleaning up Florida's now
tarnished image. Florida politicians had been embarrassed by the punch
cards so they had to get rid of them. The second part of the agenda,
however, had more to do with trying to return political contests to the
perceived predictability of yester-year. Indeed, Florida's politicians and
supervisors of election decided after the 2000 debacle, that the problem
had been with the recount process and the problem with the recount process, they surmised, was that it could not be tightly controlled, and, in
fact, had gotten completely away from them in the high stakes election of
November 2000. Thus, overhauling the voting technology was quickly
seen as the most effective way to overhaul Florida's out of control recount
process.
Central to the recount process overhaul was the introduction in Florida of a whole new type of voting system based on the use of Direct Recording Electronic voting machines ("DREs"). 4 DREs were jointly touted
by the Florida Department of State and the Florida Association of Supervisors of Elections ("FSASE"), as having "the highest levels of accuracy
and security." 5 This, coupled with the fact that several different DRE
systems went through state-sponsored "certification,"6 under what Florida officials claim is one of the most stringent certification processes in
the nation, undoubtedly lead fifteen of Florida's sixty-seven counties,
representing over half of all of Florida's voters, to purchase and install
7
DRE voting systems by late 2002.
The virtue of DREs, in the minds of Florida's political interests, lies
not in their purported accuracy and reliability (though those claims are
central to the public relations campaigns), but rather, in the fact that
DREs allegedly eliminated all possibility of overvotes,8 and reduced undervotes 9 to instances where the voter made the concious choice to with4. DRE means Direct Recording Electronic voting machines. They are also called
touch screens. DRE systems are designed to capture the voter's choices by touching a
screen. The choices are not final until the voter has had an opportunity to verify or change
any of his choices. Once the voter is satisfied, the vote is cast by either touching the screen
in an indicated location or by pressing a separate button located on the voting unit. See
Touchscreen Voting Systems Issue Paper, Joint Project of the FloridaDepartment of State
and the FloridaAssociation of Supervisors of Elections (FSASE), 1 (attached to e-mail
dated October 25, 2003 from Constance Kaplan, Supervisor of Elections, Miami-Dade
County) (hereinafter "Secretary of State/FSASE Paper") (on file with the author).
5. Secretary of State/FSASE Paper, supra n. 4, at 1.
6. See Fla. Stat. §§ 101.5606 - 101.56062 (2002).
7. See Secretary of State/FSASE Paper, supra n. 4, at 1.
8. The term "overvote" refers to instances where a voter mistakenly spoils his ballot
by voting for more than one candidate in a given race.
9. The term "undervote" refers to instances where no vote is recorded in a particular
race or contest.
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hold his vote in a particular contest. 10 In 2001, Florida's recount laws
were changed to reflect the new landscape where overvotes were nonexistant and undervotes were intentionally created. In the eyes of Florida's political interests, this new landscape dictated that the new recount
laws streamline and severly limit the scope of recounts" precisely because on DREs, the uncertainty over the meaning of overvotes and undervotes had been greatly reduced, if not eliminated. 12 But by relying on
the thesis that on DREs overvotes are non-existant and undervotes are
intentional acts of the voters, Florida's political interests essentially
wedded themselves to the claim, however unproven, that this must be so
because DREs are accurate and reliable.
II.

ENTER THE FLY IN THE OINTMENT

The premise of this paper is that as demonstrated by the experiences
of Miami-Dade County in the years following the infamous November
2000 election, the accuracy and reliability of DREs is far from clear as
the underlying technology is, to put it charitably, "not quite ready for
prime time." As a result, Florida's voting systems and elections law overhaul has been nothing short of the road to perdition - leaving the State
in a more precarious position than before 2000 when it comes to voting
system accuracy and security and converting the isolated problem of
messy manual recounts into a deeper problem of untrustworthy and unverifiable results regardless of the closeness of the contest.
A.

SEPTEMBER

2002

- THE FIRST SIGNS OF TROUBLE

In late 2001 and early 2002 Miami-Dade and Broward Counties purchased a prototype DRE known as the iVotronic sold by Nebraska-based
Election Systems & Software ("ES&S"). 13 Much like the concept car in
the local auto show, the iVotronic had never been used in any election
anywhere in the world. 14 Despite this, Miami-Dade County purchased
10. See Secretary of State's "Undervote" Fact Sheet dated July 17, 2004 (on file with
the author).
11. See Fla. Stat. § 102.141 (2002) (governing machine recounts) and § 102.166(2002)
(governing manual recounts).
12. Manual recounts, in the parlance of the November 2000 debacle, were messy, ugly
mano a mano battles that tried to gleen the intent of the voter by examining each and
every ballot where there appeared to be an overvote or, more commonly, an undervote.
13. See David F. Carr, How Florida'sVoting Machine Failed (Again), Baseline (hereinafter "Carr Article") available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mizdbln/
is_200210/aiziff32160#continue (Oct. 2002).
14. Id. Moreover, at the time that Miami-Dade County contracted with ES&S to
purchase the iVotronics, ES&S had not yet been certified by the State of Florida for its
bitmap technology (which was designed to accommodate voting in three languages) and its
text-based technology was only accomodating two languages. See Office of the Inspector
General Inquiry into Circumstances Surrounding the September 10, 2002 Election in
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7,000 of them sight unseen at a cost of $24.5 million; Broward County
15
spent $17.2 million on its machines.
The "coming out" party for Florida's DREs was the September 10,
2002 Democratic gubernatorial primary. In Miami-Dade County, the results were disastrous. 16 Some polls did not open for many hours because
pollworkers had difficulty activating the iVotronic machines, while
others opened with only one machine. 17 Where pollworkers were unable
to activate the machines, voters were turned away because there was no
back-up system of paper substitute ballots for them to vote on. i 8 Some
precincts were unable to print "zero" tapes (showing that no votes had
been cast prior to the opening of the polls). 1 9 Others were unable to
print results tapes at poll closing. 20 County pollworkers experienced
many problems collecting and reading votes from the PEBs (Personnal
Electronic Ballot - the device used to store uploaded votes). 2 1 According
to County auditors, many problems occurred because "the iVotronics
lacked self-diagnostic functions to alert pollworkers of problems encoun22
tered during activation, operation, ballot collection and deactivation."
There were reports of voters pressing the button for one candidate and
Miami-Dade County, 6 (hereinafter "OIG Inquiry") available at http://www.miamidadeig.
org/archives/Septl02002election.pdf (Sept. 20, 2002).
15. Carr, supra n. 13. Broward County's purchase was also mirred in controversy because of an alleged "shell game" on the part of county officials, "designed to give the appearance of minority participation in the lucrative $17.2 million contract." Wyatt Olson,
Broward Shell Game in New Times News (Sept. 25, 2003) (Broward County, FL).
16. A full report by the County's Office of the Inspector General would later determine
that "the debacle was, in large part, caused by the exorbitant set-up times required by the
ES&S devces." See Miami-Dade County OIG Final Report - Miami-Dade County Voting
Systems Contract No. 326, 4 (May 20, 2003) (hereinafter "OIG Report") available at http://
www.miamidadeig.org/reports/ voting%2Ofinal%20report.pdf (May 20, 2003).
17. Of the twenty-one precincts observed by Miami-Dade County audit staff, none had
all iVotronic machines working at poll opening, fifteen (seventy-one percent) had at least
one machine available for voting, six (29 percent) had none operational and one did not
have its first ballot cast until noon. See Audit Report - State Primary Election September
10, 2002 from Cathy Jackson, Director, Audit and Management Services Department to
David C. Leahy, Supervisor of Elections, 1-2, 3 (Sept. 30, 2002) (hereinafter "County Audit
Report") (on file with the author).
18. Such a back-up system was not implemented until the November 5, 2002 general
election and not until after the Miami-Dade County Commission voted to require the provision of back-up paper ballots at the level of twenty-five percent of the registered voters in
each precinct. See Miami-DadeElection Reform Coalition- FinalReport on the November
5th Election, 9 (hereinafter "MDERC Report") availableat http://www.reformcoalition.org/
Ressources/Post-Election%20Report.pdf.
19. County Audit Report, supra n. 17, at 12.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 10. The County auditors opined that "the iVotronic system design did not
adequately leverage technology by incorporating self-diagnostics, system messages, edits
and controls to minimize voter and pollworker confusion ....
ES&S should have demon-
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the name of the other candidate appearing. 23 More ominously, the specter of 2000 loomed large, in part because of widespread reports that the
problems experienced in Miami-Dade County on September 10, 2002,
24
disproportionately disadvantaged African-Americans.
What did Miami-Dade County do after September 10, 2002? In light
of the fact that there was a general state-wide election for governor coming up in less than two months, the answer is that Miami-Dade County
threw all of its resources into making sure that it did not embarrass itself again. 25 To achieve this, Miami-Dade County made the proverbial
"pact with the devil" by putting its police department in charge of preparing for and running the November 5, 2002 general election. 26 The
implication of having the police department running elections in the
world's foremost democracy did not go unnoticed or unchallanged. Almost immediately, members of community groups began demanding
clarification of the chain of command and requesting that police presence
be minimized at the polls and that voters be assured that the police role
27
would not affect their rights at the polls.
Other measures, with more lasting consequences, were required in
Miami-Dade County in order to overcome the crisis which had been created by the defective DRE technology that was, at that point, less than a
year old. Due to the lengthy boot up times for the iVotronic machines,
the County had to implement a program of setting up and turning on the
machines the night before and leaving them on all night in preparation
for the opening of the polls the next morning. 28 Even an expert hired by
the County to review the County's voting systems strongly reccomended,
in May of 2004, that the County change its practice of turning on its
strated greater proficiency in system design and been more cognizant of corresponding impact on pollworker and voter behavior." Id. at 9.
23. MDERC Report, supra n. 18, at 18-19.
24. ACLU of Florida, Analysis of September 10 Voting Fiasco in Miami-Dade Disproportionately Impacts Minorities, ACLU Says, http://www.aclufl.org/news-events/archive/
2002/racialimpactrelease.cfm (Oct. 21, 2002).
25. See OIG Inquiry, supra n. 14, at 23-31.
26. In fact, it was the Office of the Inspector General who made this recomendation,
stating that in light of the fact that the County had less than forty-two days to ready itself
for the November 5, 2002 general election, "[wie therefore recommend that County officials
immediately involve professional management personnel already available at the MiamiDade Police Department and the Miami-Dade Emergency Management Office and task
them to lead the solution effort." Id. at 23 (emphasis in original). See also MDREC Report,
supra n. 18, at 5.
27. Id. at 5-6, Exhibits "A" and "B."
28. OIG Report, supra n. 14, at 4-5 (detailing the decision, made by the County's police
director, described as the Special Project Manager, to "plan the election around known factors not new untested variables" - a reference to an interim modification proposed by
ES&S but never actually certified by the State of Florida, to reduce boot up times).

502

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXIII

machines the night before. 29 However, as of this writing, Miami-Dade
County is still turning on its voting machines the night before and leaving them on all night, at mostly unguarded polling places.
Other practices of the County in the November 5, 2002 general election that have had a lasting impact on the character of election in MiamiDade County include the use of County employees as Voting Systems
Supervisors, troubleshooters, hot line operators and pollworkers. 30 The
County employees have replaced, and in many cases displaced, the citizen pollworker 3 ' - turning what were formerly County-lead, civilian-run
elections, into County-run elections. While the costs of this practice are
less obvious in terms of maintaining the democracy and fostering civic
participation, the hard costs in terms of dollars have been made abundantly clear.
According to Miami-Dade County's assessment the November 5,
2002 general election cost the County an estimated $7,995,000.32 Assuming the County's numbers are correct, and there is every reason to
believe that the County underreported, the November 5, 2002 election
went 380 percent over budget. 3 3 Any assumption that the November
2002 general election was a "crisis anomaly" 34 went out the door when it
was revealed that the November 2004 Presidential election cost the
County a whopping $6,643,50035 putting it at 91 percent over budget. 3 6
This is without even counting the costs of the August 2004 primary
29. Douglas W. Jones, Reccomendations for Conduct of Elections in Miami-Dade
County Using the ES7S iVotronic System, at 9-10 (May 24, 2004) (on file with the author).
30. See Post ElectionAnalysis and Reccomendations, from Steve Shiver, County Manager, to Honorable Alex Penelas, Mayor, Honorable Chairperson and Members, Board of
County Commissioners, at 4-5 (Jan. 22, 2003) (hereinafter "Jan. 22, 2003 Report") (on file
with the author) "We supplemented our citizen poll workers [at each pollingplace], with a
3-person County Triangle composed of Quality Assurance Manager (QAM), Technical Support Specialist (TSS) and Verification Specialist (VS).... [and] established a pool of backup personnel for dispatchin the event of no-shows on election day." Id.
31. Id. at 8. 3,000 county employees worked the November 5, 2002 general election in
various capacities.
32. See Chart on November 2, 2004 Election Cost provided by Office of the County
Manager (hereinafter "Chart") (on file with the author). According to the Jan. 22, 2003
Report, $454,000 of the total was for "additional services received from ES&S...." See Jan.
22, 2003 Report, supra n. 30, at 4.
33. Interviews with Dan McCrea, Government Relations Chair, Miami-Dade Election
Reform Coalition (hereinafter "McCrea Interviews") (Dec. 23 and 24, 2005).
34. See Jan. 22, 2003 Report, supra n. 30, at 7 (stating that the "costs of election [for
the November 5, 2002 general election] were higher than would be expected in the future
when we have additional planning time and the knowledge leaned from November 5th.
Nevertheless, it is evident that countywide elections will cost significantly more than in
previous years") Id.
35. Chart, supra n. 32.
36. McCrea Interviews, supra n. 33.
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election which came in at approximately $3,000,000.3 7 Most telling in
the November 2004 numbers is the $1.4 million in overtime that the
38
County was required to pay its County employees working the election.
This is in addition to $788,000 in overtime spent by the County to run
39
the August 2004 primary election.
B.

2003-2004

MORE

FLAws ARE UNCOVERED

In the wake of the disastrous September 2002 primary election and
the costly, police-run November 5, 2002 general election, activists from
the Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition began to look for alternatives
to repair what Miami-Dade County's Inspector General described as an
iVotronic system that "is not fit to meet the intended use and electionsbased business requirements of Miami-Dade County."4 0 The activists
started their seach, inauspiciously enough, with a public records request,
under Florida law, for all communications between ES&S and the
County. 4 1 In response, in late 2003, the coalition received a small box of
documents. That box of documents included a two-page e-mail from a
Miami-Dade County technology specialist by the name of Orlando
Suarez to a representative of the vendor. 42 In the June 6, 2003 e-mail,
Orlando Suarez detailed his findings concerning a review that he performed of the audit log and vote image files from a precinct in the May
20, 2003 run-off election in a Miami-Dade municipality known as North
Miami. 4 3 What Orlando Suarez found was that the event log 44 and vote
image files, 45 touted by the Secretary of State as "a means by which all
votes can be ascertained,"46 were deeply flawed and had, in fact, malfunctioned to the point of being unusable: "In my humble opinion (and
37. Id.
38. Chart, supra n. 32.
39. McCrea Interviews, supra n. 33.
40. OIG Report, supra n. 14, at Cover Memorandum and Summary, 5.
41. Ltr. from Lida Rodriguez-Taseff, Miami-Dade Election Reform Coaltion, to George
Burgess, 3-4 (Oct. 27, 2003) (on file with the author).
42. E-mail from Orlando Suarez, eGov to Jimmy Carmenate, Elections, Event Log and
Vote Image Report (June 6, 2003, 11:59 A.M.) (hereinafter "Suarez June 6, 2003 E-mail")
(on file with the author).
43. Id.
44. The "event log" of a DRE records every significant event that happens with that
machine (including the time of the event), from the time it is tested, to the end of the
election, including when the machine is turned on and each and every time a vote is recorded or canceled. (Copies of event logs from actual elections using ES&S iVotronics on
file with the author).
45. The "vote image files" are the randomly sorted images of every vote cast. These
vote image files can be reduced to a printable report setting forth, in random order, every
vote cast by every voter. (Copies of vote image reports from actual elections using ES&S
iVotronics on file with the author).
46. Secretary of State/FSASE Paper, supra n. 4, at 4.
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based on my over 30 years of experience in the IT field), I believe that
there is/are a serious 'bug' in the program(s) that generate these reports
making the reports unusable for the purpose that we were considering
(audit an election, recount and [sic] election and if necessary, use these
47
reports to certify an election)."
Orlando Suarez's findings as startling as they were from the technology perspective, had a political significance far greater than even the
debacle of September 2002. While the spin masters were able to sell the
concept that the problems of September 2002 were mostly caused by normal bumps that happen with the implementation of new technology and
poor pollworker training, the findings of Orlando Suarez struck at the
core of DRE technology and exposed, for the world to see, that the tech48
nology could and did "malfunction" in an actual election.
And what a malfunction it was! The event logs and vote image files
are required by Florida State law. 4 9 Moreover, the event logs and vote
image files had been touted by the Florida Secretary of State and supervisors of elections as the reason why DREs did not need a voter-verified
paper record and why voters were protected in a close election, if the vote
needed to be audited: "It is critical to understand that each DRE has a
record that can be retrieved from each machine to show the votes that
were actually cast by the voter. While it may be a lengthy process, the
equipment can provide the authorities with the ability to demonstrate
the votes actually cast if a recount or such similar issue presented itself,
50
post election."
What happened to the Suarez June 6, 2003 E-mail in the months
following its creation should surprise no one. The memo sat, buried, no
doubt beneath mounds of paperwork, until the Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition brought the memo to light, first in a meeting with MiamiDade Supervisor of Elections Constance Kaplan in December of 200351
47. Suarez June 6, 2003 E-mail, supra n. 42, at 2.
48. Orlando Suarez wrote additional e-mails, which later came to light, giving greater
detail about the problem and his investigation. (on file with the author).
49. The Florida Voting System Standards promulgated by the Florida Department of
State require that, to be certified in Florida a voting system, "shall include the capablity to
produce records, generated by the system components .... from which all operations may
be audited [and] [e]xcept for the storage of vote images, which shall be maintained in a
random sequence, the records shall be maintained in the sequence in which the operations
were performed." Florida Voting Systems Standards, 13 available at http://election.dos.
state.fl.us/laws/proposedrules/pdfldsde101Form.pdf.
50. Secretary of State/FSASE Paper, supra n. 4, at 4.
51. Interestingly, at the December 2003 meeting, Supervisor Kaplan failed to disclose
that following up on his findings of June 2003, Orlando Suarez had reviewed an October 7,
2003 election that had taken place in the municipality of Homestead. In a memo dated
October 10, 2003, Mr. Suarez detailed his findings and stated that this time he had found
what he considered "a more srious issue," that the event log for the election had failed to
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and later in a March 12, 2004 letter to Ed Kast, Director of the Florida
Division of Elections 52 and in live testimony in front of Florida's Ethics
in Elections Committee; 53 and lastly, in a series of news articles, many of
them written by reporter Mathew Haggman, for the Daily Business
Review .54
III.

DAMAGE CONTROL

Seretary of State Glenda Hood, whose office is vested with the ultimate oversight of Miami-Dade County's elections, denied any knowledge
of the problems uncovered by Orlando Suarez until they were reported in
the Daily Business Review on May 13, 2004.55 This, despite the fact that
Prof. Mahoney had written to Ed Kast, the Director of the Division of
Elections who is under the office of the Florida Secretary of State and
had testified before the Ethics and Elections Committee in late March of
2004. Secretary of State Hood also chastised Supervisor Kaplan for failing to tell her about the problem with the event logs and vote image
56
files.
Interestingly, in February 2004, prior to the time the Secretary of
State's Office claims that it first learned of Miami-Dade's problems with
the event logs and vote image files, Ed Kast, the Director of the Division
of Elections, had rendered a legal opinion in which his office answered
the question whether, in the context of a manual recount (under Fla.
Stat. § 102.166), county supervisors of elections "who utilize touchscreen
[DRE] systems [are] required to print ballot images of all undervotes in a
recount race." 5 7 Mr. Kast answered by opining that in the context of a
recount under Fla. Stat. § 102.166, Florida counties using DREs are not
show the activity of five iVotronic machines "that accounted for 162 ballots cast." (Memo
on file with the author). The virtual 'disappearance" of the votes from five iVotronic machines was particularly shocking in light of the fact that there were only twenty-two machines used in the election. See Additional documents created by Orlando Suarez (on file
with the author).
52. Ltr. from Professor Martha Mahoney, Chair, Racial Impact Committee, MiamiDade Election Reform Committee, to Ed Kast, Director, Division of Elections (Mar. 12,
2004) (on file with the author).
53. 'On March 31, 2004, Prof. Martha Mahoney testified before the Senate Ethics &
Elections Committee, speaking against Proposed Rule 1S-2.031 and also criticizing Section
30 on Page 44 of Senate Bill SB3004 which states in part that "a manual recount may not
be conducted of undervotes on touchscreen machines." See The Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition, http://www.reformcoalition.org (accessed Jan. 1, 2006).
54. See Daily Business Review, Home Page, http://www.dailybusinessreview.com.
55. Mathew Haggman, Elections 2004 - When Did She Know?, Daily Business Review
(June 2, 2004) (Broward County, FL).
56. Id.
57. See RE:DE 04-02 Manual Recount Requirements Relating to Toucchscreen Voting
Systems; § 102.166, Florida Statutes, at 1 (Feb. 12, 2004) (available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/ TOCOpinions.shtml).
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"required to print or review the electronic ballot images of undervotes
occuring in the recounted race."5 8 He continued, stating that, "because
the rules provide no standards for review of electronic ballot images and
because the Florida Election Code requires uniformity in the application
and operation of the election laws and rules among the counties," supervisors of elections "have no authority" to look at the electronic ballot
images. 59 The answer given by Mr. Kast directly contradicts the previously stated position of both the Secretary of State and the organization
60
representing the supervisors of elections.
Soon after the Kast legal opinion was issued, the Secretary of State
proposed an administrative rule that was designed to do exactly what
the Kast legal opinion had sought to do - prohibit the review, by supervisors of elections, of the ballot images generated by the DREs. 6 1 In addition, in March of 2004, the Secretary of State's Office proposed a change
to the manual recount statute, Fla. Stat. §102.166, that would also bar
62
the review of the randomly sorted ballot images produced by the DREs.
The proposed amendment was defeated largely through the efforts of the
63
Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition.

A.

NOVEMBER

2004

AND BEYOND - THE QUESTIONS REMAIN

Prior to the November 2004 Presidential election, this author theorized that the election would not be close enough for a recount, that there
would be few, if any outward signs of problems with DREs in Florida and
that the next frontier for voting systems reform would have to be the
search for holistic solutions, rather than perceived magical cures such as
64
the all too simple voter-verified paper record.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id.
60. Secretary of State/FSASE Paper, supra n. 4, at 4.
61. ProposedRecount Rule IS-2.031. Sub-Section (7) of Rule IS-2.031 was struck down
on Aug. 27, 2004 in American Civil Liberties Union ofFlorida,Inc. v. FloridaDepartmentof
State, Case No. 04-2341RY.
62. Interivew with Alexandra Wayland, Legislative Chair, Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition (May 2004).
63. Id.
64. Speech, Lida Rodriguez-Taseff, E-Voting Syposium, The John Marshall Law School
(Chicago, IL, Oct. 1, 2004). I'll
close with this, what has now happened and what you will
see in November is the following: there will be no chaos in Florida. We paid far too much
money to avoid chaos. It's the best election money can buy. There will be no chaos. I
understand this push for election protection and all those people were going to be at the
polling place the day of the election. It means nothing. They will not be inside the polling
places and they will be unable to detect electronic voting problems.
Where are we headed from here? We need to create a system of scrutiny for every
election, an auditing system for every election and that is not going to happen in November
because this issue was not litigated by any of the political interests involved because the
political interest basically stood to one side and watched this process unfold and all they
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Post-November 2004 Florida has proven the point. In its report of
the 2004 Presidential election, Get It Right the First Time - Poll Closing
Observation, Ballot Accounting and Ballot Security,6 5 the Miami-Dade
Election Reform Coalition detailed serious problems with policies and
66
procedures that were supposed to protect the integrity of the results.
One of the problems uncovered by the coalition and detailed in the report
is how a purported machine malfunction at one precinct in Miami-Dade
County resulted in the electronic ballot stuffing of approximately 170
votes which were added to the canvass despite the fact that they did not
belong there. 67 The report also details how in over seventy percent of the
precincts in the County, for the November 2004 Presidential election, the
number of people who signed in to vote did not match the number of
votes recorded as being cast.68 Miami-Dade County is currently studying its options in terms of replacing its iVotronic machines.
For those who think that a voter-verified paper trail is the answer,
despite widespread support, DRE machine manufacturers have been
slow to come forward with technological innovations to be certified.
Moreover, studies have shown that retrofitting existing DREs with printers and voter-verified paper record capabilities will be very costly. Nor is
optical scan technology the solution. In Pasco County, a test of the central tabulation system revealed that despite having optical scans at the
polls, voters need to be worried because the central tabulation system is
vulnerable to fraud and manipulation by an insider.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There should be little question that DREs are costly, dubiously accurate and dubiously reliable systems upon which to place the future of our
democracy. There is also little question that, as demonstrated by the
political battles in Florida since 2000, DREs are dictating the evolution
of elections and are serving as the foundation for changes in the way
elections are run and results are tabulated.
were thinking about - and I'm talking Republicans, I'm talking Democrats, I'm talking
Independents, Greens, all of them in Florida - were sitting there trying to figure out how
they would benefit from an unscrutinized system.
65. The Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition, supra n. 53.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 14-18.
68. Id. at Table 4.
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